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Despite increasing scholarly interest in star employees, there remains confusion as to (1) 
what a star is, (2) how organizations can share in the value they create, and (3) whether 
notifying them of their star status within organizations increases or decreases a star’s 
turnover intentions and value capture. In light of these knowledge gaps, I seek to make 
the following contributions in this dissertation. First, I review recent multidisciplinary 
conceptual development that has led to a unified definition of stars: individuals that 
exhibit prolonged and disproportionately high performance, visibility, and social capital. 
Second, while prior work suggests that, to capture more value, organizations must impose 
barriers that constrain the mobility of stars, I take an alternative perspective, drawing 
from the micro literature on organizational embeddedness to identify voluntary mobility 
constraints. Third, there is surprisingly little research on whether stars should be notified 
of their star status in the organizational setting despite the practical implications it might 
have on their turnover intentions and an organizations ability to capture value from them. 
Consequently, I build theory to understand the implications of star status notification on 
subsequent turnover intentions and value capture. Mixed support for hypotheses is 
achieved from a field sample of “high potential” employees in a mid-sized financial 
services firm. Notably, important antecedents of embeddedness and retention among stars 
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 Throughout history, societies have sustained a fascination with individuals who 
enjoy outstanding accomplishment (Rojek, 2001; Simonton, 1994). In organizations, 
increased output—localized among an elite few—has characterized the changing 
economy over the last fifty years (Rosen, 1981). As a result, some have argued that star 
employees—or those that exhibit disproportionately high and sustained performance, 
visibility, and social capital (Call, Nyberg, & Thatcher, 2015)—are critical to 
organizational success and even competitive advantage (Aguinis & Bradley, 2015; 
Aguinis & O’Boyle, 2014; Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2014; Groysberg, 2012; Oldroyd & 
Morris, 2012). Despite recent scholarly interest, ambiguity accompanies research 
concerning (1) what a star is, (2) how organizations can share in the value they create, 
and (3) how to manage stars (Call, Nyberg, & Thatcher, 2015). After briefly reviewing 
these three knowledge gaps, I will devote chapters 1 – 3, respectively, to addressing each 
gap.  
First, confusion about what a star is likely arises from the fact that knowledge on 
the construct is spread across disciplines that rarely cite one another. Economists, largely 
starting with Rosen’s (1981) seminal paper, have been particularly interested in the 
market dynamics that have led to the proliferation of stars in the last 75 years. They argue 
that changes in mass production and consumption have led to a winner-take-all 
environment (Frank & Cook, 2013; Rosen, 1981); thus, relatively small differences in 
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talent between the best and the next best lead to large differences in productivity. Alder 
(1985) would argue that in some cases no differences in talent is apparent between the 
star and non-star. Sociologists have described virtuous cycles in which high status 
individuals garner more credit and gain more resources for similar work product to that of 
low status peers. Described as the “Mathew effect” (Merton, 1968b) or a cumulative 
advantage (Cole & Cole, 1973), this perceptually driven process describes how the “rich 
get richer” and is an important process in the making of stars. Lastly, psychologists have 
devoted significant attention to understanding the origins of expert performance (Ericsson 
& Charness, 1994), arguing that deliberate practice is what leads to outstanding 
accomplishment. Each of these disciplines provides unique insights, but a conceptual 
integration is needed in order to bring clarity to the construct of stars. 
Second, little is known about how organizations can capitalize on a star’s value 
creation. As stars gain visibility in the external job market, they also gain bargaining 
power to bid up their wages because of their increased job mobility (Groysberg, Nanda, 
& Nohria, 2004). More specifically, scant knowledge exists about how organizations can 
create discretionary or voluntary mobility constraints1 for these individuals such that they 
are less willing or able to bid up their wages. The extant strategy literature has implicitly 
assumed that labor markets are efficient and that the demand for labor is matched by 
supply (B. Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012)—largely ignoring the fact that workers 
operate under a myriad of motivational forces and that they may respond 
idiosyncratically to external labor demand forces (Coff, 1997). If we fail to understand 
how managers can cultivate voluntary mobility constraints on stars, the economic view of 
                                                          
1 These are synonymous with what Campbell et al., (2012) refer to as “supply-side” mobility constraints 
referring to the extent that workers are (un)willing to supply their labor to the external labor market. 
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efficient labor markets might conclude that value simply cannot be obtained by 
employing stars, in the absence of institutionalize mobility constraints, like non-compete 
contracts (Ganco, Ziedonis, & Agarwal, 2015; Marx, Strumsky, & Fleming, 2009). To 
address this gap, I integrate human capital (B. Campbell et al., 2012) and organizational 
embeddedness2 (Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, & Erez, 2001) theory and relax the 
assumption that the labor market for stars is efficient to uncover the antecedent and 
consequences of voluntary mobility constraints that exist for stars.  
 Third, with previous stars research focusing on stars after-the-fact, we know little 
about managing stars and the implications that different managerial strategies might have 
on them (Call et al., 2015). In light of this notion, I seek to understand an important, yet 
under-examined theoretical question: when a star is officially branded by an organization 
with star status, does it have a positive or negative impact on the subsequent value 
creation and turnover intentions of the star3? Some have suggested that communicating 
star status is crucial in the development, performance, and retention of stars because of 
the validation this designation provides (Fernandez-Araoz, Groysberg, & Nohria, 2011; 
Iles, 2006)—the 2015 AON Hewitt Top Companies for Leaders reports this as a best 
practice and notes that top companies communicate star status 27% more often than 
lower performing companies (AON Hewitt, 2015). However, an extensive literature 
                                                          
2 Following Ng and Feldman (2010), I use the term “organizational” instead of “job” embeddedness 
because my interest is in those factors that constrain mobility within an organization, not within a job that 
can exist in multiple organizations. 
3 Organizations have several names for programs dealing with this type of status designation (e.g., rising 
star, high potential, fast-track, high flier). Interviews with talent leadership of several companies revealed 
that the high potential designation is given to those with perceived “C-suite” potential, but just under half 
of firms inform their high potentials that they are considered as such. These high potentials have a proven 
track record of performance and have gained the visibility and social capital to be considered for executive 
leadership development. Thus, they provide an adequate phenomenological example of stars in the modern 
workplace and are subsequently used for my empirical testing of hypotheses.  
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search yields very few empirical tests of whether positive individual effects result from 
star status communication on star’s subsequent performance and turnover intentions.  
 Inversely, research is replete suggesting there are perils associated with high 
status and status change in particular (Exline & Lobel, 1999; Fragale, Rosen, Xu, & 
Merideth, 2009; Jensen, Patel, & Raver, 2014; Pettit, Sivanathan, Gladstone, & Marr, 
2013), which would suggest star status designation may have a negative impact on the 
subsequent performance of stars. Additionally, those recognized with star status often 
become more visible and have stronger signals of quality in the job market (Spence, 
1973)—leading to higher turnover intentions. As such, we lack understanding about if, or 
when, star status notification will increase a star’s performance and retention. To address 
this tension, I build theory to hypothesize that star status notification will have a positive 
effect on turnover intentions and organizational value capture from stars.  
 In addressing these knowledge gaps, I purposefully take a multidisciplinary 
approach, invoking and integrating both macro and micro theories (i.e., strategic human 
capital, job embeddedness, turnover, and status) to inform stars research; such integration 
provides more nuanced answers than each literature would individually because each 
discipline provides a unique vantage point (Ployhart & Hale, 2014). For example, while 
job mobility and human capital literatures provide insights into why a star’s visibility in 
the labor market increases their bargaining power to capture the value they create in 
organizations (Groysberg et al., 2004), job embeddedness theory sheds light on what 
might motivate a star to stay with an organization despite more financially attractive 
opportunities elsewhere (Mitchell et al., 2001). Together, these perspectives inform a 
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more holistic view of the value creation and capture process that exists between 
organizations and stars. 
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW: TOWARDS A UNIFIED CONSTRUCT 
 Although stars are assumed to be unique and add disproportionate organizational 
value compared to non-stars, star performer research has suffered from ambiguity 
resulting in remarkably little consensus or construct clarity across research domains (Call 
et al., 2015). While different conceptualizations are common across settings, the resulting 
construct ambiguity can stifle the scientific process (Molloy & Ployhart, 2012; Suddaby, 
2011). The lack of a consensus around who a star is reflects the propensity for research 
on stars to be conducted within isolated research disciplines—namely, economics (e.g., 
Rosen, 1981), sociology (e.g., Zucker & Darby, 1996), management (e.g., Groysberg et 
al., 2008), and applied psychology (Aguinis & O’Boyle, 2014).  
 As such, in an effort to clarify the stars construct in order to have a starting point 
to build arguments upon in the proceeding sections, I review a recently published 
typology on stars (i.e., Call et al., 2015). This literature review inductively highlights 
each dimension of stars and gives way for theory building in the chapters to follow.  
1.1.1 Literature Search 
 Call et al. (2015) conducted an extensive literature search yielding 76 papers 
addressing the stars construct and classified each article based on its salient concepts. 
Three broad themes emerged: stars have disproportionately high (1) performance, (2) 
visibility, and (3) social capital. As such, in the following section, I first conceptually 
integrate multidisciplinary knowledge accumulated on stars, and build rationale for 
defining stars as: individuals who exhibit disproportionately high and sustained (1) 
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performance, (2) visibility, and (3) social capital. This definition includes three necessary 
dimensions (i.e., performance, visibility, and social capital), each of which are sustained 
and disproportionately high.  
1.1.2 Disproportionately High 
 First, the term disproportionately high is included in the definition because 
contextual differences exist across situations with respect to what constitutes “high” 
performance, visibility, and social capital. Thus, where employees fall on the distribution 
of these three definitional dimensions relative to their peers is what qualifies them as 
stars. The omission of actual benchmarks allows for large contextual differences that 
occur when observing stars in different settings. 
 Using relative levels makes this construct vulnerable to the same issues that 
equity theory has been criticized for (Greenberg, 2001)—namely, that choice of referents 
can be somewhat ambiguous. For example, a high school basketball player can exhibit 
disproportionately high performance, visibility, and social capital in their league, but 
once they play at the college level, they fall into obscurity. The theoretical implications of 
stardom should be similar—although at varying degrees—in both strong (e.g., NBA 
basketball players) and weak (e.g., high school basketball players) situations. This is not 
to say that one can pick an arbitrary referent group (e.g., low performers) in order to 
evaluate a potential star against; there must be a clear argument for why the referent 
group is relevant and meaningful. By qualifying performance, visibility, and social 
capital as disproportionately high, research can more easily find agreement on who a star 
is across contexts. 
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1.1.3 Sustained  
Sustained is included in the definition in order to distinguish stars from those with 
fleeting fame or one-time successes. Sustained performance leads observers to attribute 
performance to the performer rather than circumstance. On the other hand, the first time 
an individual produces extremely high performance (e.g., a newly hired salesperson 
leading her business unit in sales), some may think it is the result of other factors outside 
the control of the salesperson. The time it takes observers to make star status attributions 
will vary by context. When there is less causal ambiguity with regard to how 
performance is attained (e.g., when performance metrics are objective versus subjective, 
when work product is not dependent on a team; Darley & Goethals, 1980), star status 
attributions will occur at a faster pace.  
 Each dimension of the star definition (i.e., performance, visibility, and social 
capital) is sensitive to this temporal element, and over time, each dimension influences 
every other dimension. For example, sustained performance at disproportionately high 
levels will lead to attributions of success that can facilitate greater visibility and greater 
relevant social capital—virtuous cycles are present in causal attribution of stars status 
(Kelley, 1973).  
1.1.4 Performance 
 Although not clearly defined by specific quantifiable levels, there is general 
agreement that to be a star, employees must engage in disproportionately high 
performance relative to most other workers (Aguinis & O’Boyle, 2014; Groysberg et al., 
2008; Rosen, 1981). Although high performance is a necessary condition, the extent to 
which performance must be disproportional is unclear.  
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 While most star definitions include performance, an extensive review of the stars 
literature suggest that performance alone is insufficient to define a star (Call et al., 2015). 
Many studies posit that a star will also have high visibility (Groysberg et al., 2008) and 
social capital (Oldroyd & Morris, 2012), leading to distinguishing between those with 
disproportionately high performance accompanied by disproportionately high visibility 
and social capital and those who only have high performance—which we refer to as high 
performers. There have been many high performer studies (Maltarich, Nyberg, & Reilly, 
2010; Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau, & Gerhart, 2003) that are not considered part of stars 
research. Rather, stars research should be considered a subset of the high performer 
research as performance is a necessary but insufficient condition for stardom. 
 Distinguishing stars from high performers raises questions about the relationship 
between disproportionally high performance that leads to being designated a star and 
performance that does not fall into the star category. While performance often leads to 
recognition and opportunities, sustained visibility and relevant social capital do not 
necessarily result from disproportionately high performance. Thus, to be a star, a 
disproportionately high performer must also have sustained and disproportionately high 
visibility and relevant social capital. 
1.1.5 Visibility 
 Visibility is the extent to which an employee’s job performance and reputation are 
observable (Merton, 1958; Merton, 1968) both in and out of the organization4. When job 
performance is difficult to observe (e.g., knowledge work), other market signals (e.g., 
                                                          
4 Visibility is conceptually distinct from reputation, which is the “set of judgements a community makes 
about the personal qualities of one of its members” (Emler, 1990, p. 171); while visibility deals with the 
extent to which ones reputation is widely known, reputation deals solely with the content of judgements 
made about an actor’s personal quality. 
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promotions; Spence, 1973) will act as a proxy for job performance. Thus, we define stars 
as having sustained and disproportionately high visibility relative to others.  
 Visibility is a consistent theme in extant stars literatures (e.g., Groysberg et al., 
2008; Oldroyd & Morris, 2012), and qualitatively changes the way employees should be 
managed. For example, visibility leads to greater scrutiny with respect to a star’s 
treatment by the organization relative to other employees. Visibility also provides stars 
with more external job options and provides stars with leverage to garner organizational 
resources.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, I explore the distinction between internal 
visibility (e.g., within the star’s organization) and external visibility (e.g., in the external 
labor market) because I will argue that internal and external visibility have divergent 
implications for organizations with regard to retention and value capture. Going forward 
(in chapter 2), I build theory that internal and external visibility have opposite effects on 
an organization’s ability to capture value from the value created by the star. For instance, 
external visibility will lead to higher mobility and likelihood of turnover, while internal 
visibility should lead to higher perceived fit (between the star and the organization) and, 
thus, decrease the likelihood of turnover. Because the distinction of both internal and 
external visibility has not been addressed in the extant stars literature, uncovering this 
nuance leads to a better understanding of the value capture process.  
1.1.6 Social Capital 
 Stars have been found to capitalize on valuable relationships to garner 
disproportionately high amounts of social capital (P. Azoulay & Zivin, 2006; Pierre 
Azoulay, Graff Zivin, & Wang, 2010; Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2014; Oettl, 2012; 
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Oldroyd & Morris, 2012). Social capital is the value obtained through relationships 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988) or the ‘goodwill’ others have toward an individual by 
which resources, information, influence, and solidarity are accessed (P. S. Adler & 
Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). An individual’s social capital can affect an 
array of outcomes, including finding a job (Granovetter, 1973), career success (Burt, 
1992; Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001), and accumulating human capital (Coleman, 
1988; Nyberg, Moliterno, Hale, & Lepak, 2014). As with visibility, unique implications 
will occur based on whether the social capital is internal or external to the organization 
(i.e., when social capital is housed within the organization versus outside the 
organization). Thus, in chapter 2, I make this important distinction between internal and 
external social capital and derive predictions for organizational value capture based on 
whether a stars social capital is housed within or outside organizational boundaries.  
 I provide three reasons why disproportionately high and sustained relevant social 
capital is a necessary dimension of the stars definition. First, great achievements often 
rely on the effort and abilities of many. For instance, innovation is often collaborative 
(Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2014; Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 2007). While credit tends to 
localize around a star, their performance is affected by several actors (Jones, 2009). For 
example, in the movie industry, the team working on a film and the star’s network 
centrality were found to be more responsible for a film’s success than the star alone 
(Rossman, Esparza, & Bonacich, 2010). Further, Grigoriou and Rothaermel (2014) found 
that those who were both disproportionately productive and socially connected increased 
output quantity and quality.  
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 Second, social capital often creates opportunities. When several people could fill 
an organizational need, internal social capital can determine who receives the 
opportunity. Likewise, in situations where several individuals could fill a market need, 
external social capital can determine who receives the opportunity. Hence, relevant social 
capital can provide unique opportunities to perform, apply expertise to new contexts, and 
be visible to a larger audience. We note that one’s social connections are more likely to 
govern opportunities in contexts where there is ambiguity in talent identification (Nyberg, 
2010; Tervio, 2009). 
 Third, relevant social capital is instrumental in gaining access to resources (both 
internal and external) that assist in accumulating and appropriating human capital 
(Coleman, 1988). For instance, expert performance scholars suggest that social resource 
constraints hinder developing expertise (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993) 
because social capital in the form of access to mentors and tutors is helpful for 
development. Social capital also helps with job opportunities (Granovetter, 1973) and 
promotions (Seibert et al., 2001) that provide relevant experience. 
 As with performance and visibility, non-stars can also have high levels of relevant 
social capital. When individuals possess social capital without high performance, the 
benefits may be short lived. These are employees who make great connections and 
provide useful resources for their organizations (Burt, 1992), but who do not achieve star 
status due to a lack of individual performance—I refer to these employees as social stars 
(Figure 1). Social capital does not guarantee successful performance, making it a 
necessary but insufficient condition of stardom. 
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1.2 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
 As the stars construct is still in its infant stage, there are several considerations 
that need to be acknowledged for future work. Call and colleagues (2015) acknowledge 
that, “Although we present a multidimensional definition of stars, future research should 
explore each dimension’s effect independently as well as collectively” (p. 12). This logic 
is reflected in a recent typology of stars (Kehoe, Lepak, & Bentley, in press) that 
distinguishes between performance stars, status stars (the latter dealing more with 
visibility), and universal stars (individuals having high performance and status).  
 It is important to also note that the dimensions of stardom may have a tendency to 
compensate for one another. For example, if an employee has extremely high 
performance, they might be considered a star even without disproportionately high 
visibility or social capital. Although star status is socially constructed, the purpose of the 
preceding literature review was to try and codify what remains a socially driven process 
in order to avoid “false star” identification.  
 Now that rationale has been provided for a unified definition, going forward I 
draw on these outlined star characteristics to gain a deeper understanding of an 
organization’s ability to capture value from star employees.  In particular, in Chapter 2, I 
explore the impact that internal visibility and social capital might have on a star’s 
mobility and organizational value capture. Then in Chapter 3, I explore the implications 





FIGURE 1.1 THREE DEFINITIONAL DIMENSIONS OF STAR EMPLOYEES AND RELATED 
CONSTRUCTS (ADAPTED FROM CALL ET AL., 2015).*  
 
Note. Definitions of related constructs: High performer: “the top 10% of peers in one's specific area 
of expertise” (Gallardo-Gallardo, Dries, & González-Cruz, 2013, p. 295). Experts: those who 
demonstrate “consistently superior performance on a specified set of representative tasks for a 
domain” (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996, p 277). One hit wonders are defined as those with short-term 
performance that is not maintained. Celebrity is defined as “an overtly public individual” (Marshall, 
1997). I define Social stars as those with disproportionate social capital. 





























































STARS AND VALUE CAPTURE 
The socially complex and path dependent nature of the emergence of human 
capital resources (HCR; Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011) within organizations has lead 
scholars to posit HCR as a mechanism through which competitive advantage can be 
obtained (Barney & Wright, 1998). Recently, stars have been categorized as a type of 
HCR (Ployhart, Nyberg, Reilly, & Maltarich, 2014) capable of influencing organizational 
performance (Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2014; R. Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2014). However, 
stars enjoy high visibility and social capital in the external labor market, which gives 
them extreme job mobility that limits an organization’s bargaining power in value 
appropriation (Coff, 1997). In many cases, strong market signals of a star’s performance 
overinflate their value (Groysberg et al., 2008, 2004). As such, stars often have the 
bargaining power to capture most, if not all of the value they create in organizations. A 
star’s immense bargaining power thus limits an organization’s ability to utilize them for 
competitive advantage (Coff, 1999). These ideas rely on the implicit assumption that 
where there is a demand for stars in the labor market, stars will necessarily be willing to 
supply their labor to meet this demand (B. Campbell et al., 2012). In this chapter, I relax 
this assumption to argue that voluntary mobility constraints may exist for stars.  
 Following Coff’s (1997, 2011) logic that the “nature of the resources that drive 
rent5 generation also influence the patterns of how the rent is distributed” (Coff, 2011: 
                                                          
5 Rent is generally defined in terms of the profit produced by a resource—often in perpetuity (Coff, 1999). 




360), I argue that HCRs embedded in stars can be isolated from competitors through the 
star’s motivation to perform and remain within the organization which results from the 
idiosyncratic nature of the employee – organization relationship between the star and 
his/her organization. To this end, I describe motivational factors that might influence 
stars to be embedded in their organizations and forego opportunities outside the 
organization, essentially allowing organizations to capture value that would have 
otherwise been captured by the star.  
 Specifically, previous literature has posited the impact of a stars visibility and 
social capital primarily as it exists outside organizational boundaries to make them more 
mobile in the job market. Alternatively, I suggest that when visibility and social capital 
are internal—or exist inside organizational boundaries—they will have the opposite 
effect and decrease a star’s mobility, thus, working as a voluntary mobility constraint 
leading to organizational value capture.  
Going forward, I theorize that the unique nature of a star’s motivation to 
accumulate visibility and social capital (Call, et al., 2015) provides an opportunity for 
organizational value capture from stars. More specifically, organizations can capitalize on 
a star’s motivation to cultivate internal visibility and social capital to limit mobility. By 
unpacking the differential value of both a star’s internal and external visibility and social 
capital, we outline how organizations can simultaneously retain stars while benefiting 
from their presence. Prior to this line of reasoning, I integrate turnover theory to further 
uncover voluntary star mobility constraints by extending the construct of organizational 
embeddedness (Mitchell et al., 2001) to star performers. To the extent stars are embedded 
in their organizational environments, organizations will have the ability to capture 
relatively more economic value from the star (See Figure 3 for the theoretical model). 




2.1 ORGANIZATIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL VALUE 
CAPTURE FROM STARS 
 
 Previous turnover theory is often grounded in March and Simon’s (1958) 
reasoning that employees voluntarily quit when they lack satisfaction with their current 
job, perceive ease of movement in the external labor market, or some combination of 
these two factors. Thus far, stars research has taken a similar approach. Scholars have 
assumed that, to the extent that stars are visible, their job opportunities increase 
(Groysberg et al., 2008). These job opportunities decrease an organization’s ability to 
capture value from stars because they are assumed to have leverage to bid up their wages. 
Current research concludes that to the extent that an environment lacks mobility barriers 
(e.g., litigation of non-compete contracts), efficient labor markets will bid up the price of 
stars (Ganco et al., 2015; Marx et al., 2009).  
 Strategic factor markets—defined as “a market where the resources necessary to 
implement a strategy are obtained” (Barney, 1986; p. 1231)—are “perfect” when the cost 
to implement a resource is equal to the value obtained from resource deployment. Thus, 
perfect strategic factor markets are unable to yield above normal economic returns, thus, 
simply obtaining resources is not enough—they must produce more value than they cost. 
However, imperfections in strategic factor markets are common (Barney, 1986) and 
resources can often be isolated from competitors (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990; Rumelt, 
1984). Going forward, I seek to uncover imperfections in the strategic factor market for 
stars—without which, above normal economic returns from stars would be impossible. 
 In an effort to uncover psychological mechanisms that might serve as voluntary 
mobility constraints that lead to imperfection in the factor market for employees (and 
stars) and give an organization the opportunity to capture value, it is important that I 




clarify some definitions in order to substantiate some common language around what is 
meant by (1) value, (2) value creation, and (3) organizational value capture.  
2.1.1 Value, Value Creation, and Organizational Value Capture 
 I broadly define value as the worth, utility, or usefulness of a given item, having 
both subjective and objective components when assessed by a specific actor (Lepak, 
Smith, Taylor, & Smith, 2007; Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2016; Peteraf & Barney, 
2003). In this context, I am interested in the value of stars where the consumer (the one 
making the value assessment) is the employing organization. I follow the classical 
economist view of value taken by several management theorists to demarcate value into 
two categories: (1) Use value and (2) exchange value (Brymer, Molloy, & Gilbert, 2014; 
B. Campbell et al., 2012; Lepak et al., 2007). Use value (the subjective component of 
value) is the perceived worth of a resource (e.g., employee, product etc.) stemming from 
the idiosyncratic needs of the organization (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000). Exchange 
value (the objective component of value) is the agreed upon price of the resource in its 
respective market for acquisition (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2001). Although the exchange 
value is assessed at a single point in time (i.e., the time of the exchange) it may change 
over time between exchanges. When the use value exceeds the exchange value, there 
exist what economists call a “consumer surplus” (Whitehead, 1996). 
 Value creation is defined as behaviors or processes by which an item of worth, 
utility, or usefulness is generated. Thus, value creation is distinct from value in that it is 
the process by which value is produced and can result in use value, exchange value, or 
both. In the organizational context, value is often derived from employees as a function 
of their job performance. At a conceptual level, a star’s performance is synonymous with 
their value creation because job performance, as measured in many performance rating 




scales, is often a deliberate statement of the behaviors and outcomes that align with an 
organizations strategy (J. P. Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993).  
 Finally, because I am interested in value capture from the organizations 
perspective, I define organizational value capture as the extent to which an organization 
is able to appropriate value co-created within its boundaries. While value creation 
describes the genesis of value, value capture describes what happens after the value is 
created. Multiple interested stakeholders (e.g., organization, employee) will vie for the 
value produced in organizations, resulting in a process of negotiating value capture. 
Value capture is particularly salient when value is co-created as in the organizational 
setting (Ramirez, 1999). This is because when value is co-created, there is often 
ambiguity with regard to the source of the value created, which makes value capture an 
ongoing process of negotiating (Blyler & Coff, 2003). For example, when an 
organization invests in a new sales training program that results in increased sales, even 
though the increase in value was arguably generated by the organizations investment in 
training, the employee might still ask for a raise upon increasing their sales. Once value is 
created, it becomes “up-for-grabs” (See Figure 2). I note that value capture is a zero-sum 
endeavor, while value creation is not. Thus, certain factors may shift value sharing by 
increasing the pie more in favor of one stakeholder, other factors may simply shift value 
creation one way without increasing the pie. Going forward, I build theory and 
hypotheses about the relative likelihood of organizational value capture, while I refrain 
from making predictions about value creation (increasing the pie); predictions such as 
this lie outside the scope of this dissertation.  
 While I draw on the economics and strategic management literature for the above 
definitions, going forward, I will explicate the psychological factors that will influence 




value creation and capture among stars. This novel approach departs from previous stars 
literature that has focused on market driven factors that influence organizational value 
capture.  
 












FIGURE 2.1 DEPICTION OF THE VALUE-SHARING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
STARS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS 
 
2.1.2 Antecedents and Consequences of Organizational Embeddedness among Stars 
 In an effort understand the totality of forces that encourage staying in 
organizations, I extend the job embeddedness construct (e.g., Jiang, Liu, McKay, Lee, & 
Mitchell, 2012; Lee, Mitchell, Sablynski, Burton, & Holtom, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2001) 
which describes the factors beyond labor market conditions can make employees 
embedded in their organizations. Ultimately arguing that to the extent that stars are 
embedded in their organizations, organizational value capture will become more likely. 
Mitchell & Lee and colleagues argue that staying is driven by job or organizational 




embeddedness6, defined as the myriad of integrated forces that create a ‘web’ within an 
organization in which an individual might become stuck (see Jiang et al., 2012 for a meta 
analysis). Specifically, the three dimensions describing an employee’s embeddedness are 
the (1) links, (2) fit, and (3) sacrifice that embed an employee to an organization 
(Mitchell et al., 2001). As such, I argue that these three dimensions act as voluntary 
mobility constraints—or mobility constraining factors that can be cultivated without 
monetary incentive. In this way, organizational embeddedness carries strategic value 
because the discretionary mobility constraints resulting from a star’s embeddedness 
create an imperfection in the strategic factor market for stars (Barney, 1986; B. Campbell 
et al., 2012).  
 The links, fit, and sacrifice that drive organizational embeddedness are comprised 
of both on and off-the-job elements: First, on and off-the-job links consist of both formal 
and informal relationships and connections (e.g., friends, group memberships, and 
psychological attachments) that an individual has within their organization and 
community. At work, the amount of social integration and solidarity or the number of 
affective bonds cultivated lead to more embeddedness. In the community, membership in 
community groups, having children in school, or owning a home constrain mobility and 
increase embeddedness.  
 Second, the perceived fit—or the comfort and compatibility one experiences in 
their organization and surrounding environment (Kristof, 1996)—creates voluntary 
mobility constraints. When individuals feel that their skills are being utilized and valued 
                                                          
6 I note that Mitchell et. al., provided acceptable discriminant validity, arguing organizational 
embeddedness to be theoretically and empirically distinct from constructs like job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment. Some researchers have used the word “organizational” instead of “job” 
embeddedness (Ng & Feldman, 2007, 2010) because jobs can exist in more than one organization—thus, 
going forward, I use the term organizational embeddedness because it is more germane to my discussion 
here on organizational value capture.  




and when the culture, values, goals, and norms inherent in an organization and 
community are congruent with the stars values, turnover will be less likely (Edwards & 
Cable, 2009). This is because fit is hard to assess a priori and is partially dependent on 
the unique history that an individual shares with their organizational environment 
(Edwards, 2008). Thus, as a star evaluates other employment alternatives, there is 
uncertainty as to whether he will find a similar fit in a new organization and a new 
investment of time will be required in order to replicate a history with the new 
organization.  
 Lastly, both of these factors increase the sacrifice that a departure from an 
organization would represent. As such, the material or psychological sacrifice that would 
occur in the event of attrition signifies the final dimension of organizational 
embeddedness (Mitchell et al., 2001). Material sacrifices include non-portable stock 
options, accruable benefits, job stability, and seniority benefits (Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, & 
Gupta, 1998). A stars spouse may have a job in the area which would be hard to sacrifice 
both financially and psychologically. Individuals that own a home may not be financially 
willing or able to sell their home, making the sacrifice of leaving the community where 
they live greater. These material sacrifices will act as voluntary mobility constraints.  
However, it has been stated as a premise that stars often are able to inflate their 
worth in the external labor market (Groysberg et al., 2008) making the material sacrifice 
less important—this adds salience to the psychological sacrifice of leaving. Stars might 
cultivate a particular type of psychological investment in organizations as a result of their 
strategic role and accrued influence within the organization (Galvin, Lange, and 
Ashforth, in press). A stars investment in shaping an organization could cultivate the 
sense that they have built something which will be attached to their legacy (Zacher, 




Rosing, & Frese, 2011)—this would represent a large psychological sacrifice, should they 
leave.  
When organizations cultivate a star’s psychological attachment to the 
organization, they will have increased leverage to isolate them from the competition and, 
thus, capture value from them. A star might ask the question, “Can I replicate or improve 
my situation in another organization?” Both the social integration (links) and congruence 
in values and goals (fit) that an individual experiences within an organization are 
idiosyncratic to that organization. Thus, the abundance and unique mix of links and fit 
experienced will cause a star a large psychological sacrifice if he or she were to leave. 
 Although embeddedness among stars is likely to have different antecedents than 
embeddedness among non-stars (discussed in the following sections), I argue that stars 
can become embedded in their organizations, such that they will be less likely to leave 
even in the face of increased job alternatives—particularly because there is a 
psychological sacrifice associated with leaving. Because their turnover intentions are 
lower, they are less likely to seriously consider alternative job opportunities. These job 
opportunities are what give stars the leverage to bid their wage up and capture the value 
they create (Coff, 1999; March & Simon, 1958). When stars are less likely to entertain 
job opportunities because they are embedded in their current organizations, they are less 
likely to bid up their wage to market value (Coff, 1997)—creating an imperfection in the 
strategic factor market for stars (Barney, 1986). As such, I argue that when stars are more 
embedded in their organizations, the organization will be able to capture more value form 
the star. Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 1: A star’s organizational embeddedness is positively related to 
organizational value capture. 




 Micro research that focuses on employee retention often presupposes that 
retention is the ultimate goal (Holtom, Mitchell, Lee, & Eberly, 2008) and implicitly 
neglects the idea that there is a net value that is appropriated from employees (Coff, 
1999) consisting of the employees value creation minus the cost of continuing their 
employment (Abelson & Baysinger, 1984). The job mobility literature, drawing on 
assumptions made by human capital theorists (e.g., Becker, 1964), largely assumes that 
labor markets will drive up the prices of workers to the extent that there is the ability to 
transfer human capital across settings (i.e., when human capital is not organization 
specific). In line with more recent theory which questions these assumptions (Campbell, 
Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012), I argue that turnover intentions are a key driver of 
organizational value capture from stars. When stars are less willing to supply their labor 
to the external labor market because there is a large sacrifice associated with their 
departure, it will create an inefficiency in the labor market for stars and, thus impact the 
value capture negotiation between stars and their employing organizations.  
In the value creation and appropriation negotiation the organization acts in a profit 
maximizing, rationale manner—continually seeking to capitalize on value created by 
employees. On the other hand, employees may not always act in the same maximizing 
manner (Simon, 1982). The decision to engage in the value appropriation negotiation 
(e.g., ask for a raise) is not a part of employees active processing, except at times when it 
is made salient (e.g., annual reviews, end of year raises). In order to gain leverage in the 
value capture negotiation, employees must provide evidence that they are worth more on 
the external labor market. This is why an empirical relationship has been demonstrated 
between external job mobility and salary earned (Lam, Ng, & Feldman, 2012)—those 
who can provide evidence of alternative offers earn higher salaries.  




The unfolding model of turnover describes how individuals are more likely to 
turnover if they experience a “shock” (Lee, Mitchell, Wise, & Fireman, 1996; Lee & 
Mitchell, 1994), which puts them in the mindset or mental ‘script’ where a change in 
employment is more feasible. Following this logic, those that have entered into a mental 
process where alternative employment is desired (i.e., high turnover intentions) are more 
likely to be aware of job alternatives. Because they are actively looking into alternative 
job opportunities, they also have more up-to-date and accurate information on what their 
employable worth is on the job market. This external wage information gives the star the 
ability to ask his/her organization to increase their wage—thus decreasing organizational 
value capture. Thus, both the leverage and motivation to engage in the value 
appropriation negotiation is more likely when turnover intentions are high.  
While previous job embedded literature has established a negative relationship 
with turnover intentions (Crossley, Bennett, Jex, & Burnfield, 2007), I uniquely extend 
this previous work as the mediating path between organizational embeddedness and 
organizational value capture. This leads to my next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: A star’s organizational embeddedness has a positive indirect effect 
on organizational value capture through decreasing turnover intentions. 
2.2 INTERNAL VISIBILITY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL, ORGANIZATIONAL 
EMBEDDEDNESS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL VALUE CAPTURE  
As outlined in chapter 1, star performers differ from high performers because, in 
addition to disproportionally high performance, they also exhibit disproportionately high 
visibility and social capital. Thus, stars—who amass disproportionately high performance 
accompanied by visibility and social capital—may be motivated by the opportunity to be 
visible and make strategic social connections (Call et al., 2015). Understanding the 




implications of a star’s visibility and social capital—both internal and external to the 
organization—can aid organizations in providing incentives that simultaneously benefit 
the organization and retain the star (i.e., act as isolating mechanisms) because 
organizations possess the ability to facilitate and manage a star’s visibility and social 
capital. Ultimately, I argue that internal visibility and social capital will increase 
organizational value capture by way of increasing organizational embeddedness.  
Although previous research has focused on the risks of high employee visibility 
(Groysberg et al., 2008) and social capital (Blyler & Coff, 2003) because they increase 
employee mobility and value capture, I make the delineation that visibility and social 
capital can be internal or external to the organization (Payne, Moore, Griffis, & Autry, 
2010) and that this distinction changes whether value can be captured from the stars 
performance. This is because only external visibility provides information to competitors 
about the stars strategic worth, reducing the likelihood of exploiting an “imperfection” in 
the strategic factor market for stars (Barney, 1986). While the stars mobility is increased 
by external visibility and social capital, the opposite is true when a star’s visibility and 
social capital are internal to the organization—or housed within organizational 
boundaries because it can increase the stars organizational embeddedness. In the 
following, I will discuss why internal and external visibility and social capital will have 
disparate effects.  
External Visibility. External visibility refers to the extent the star’s performance 
and reputation are observable outside organizational boundaries. Stars become more 
mobile to the extent that they enjoy external visibility (Allen & Griffeth, 2001; March & 
Simon, 1958). This is primarily because their reputation for high performance is simply 
known by more employers outside their current organization and this results in more 




external job opportunities. When job opportunities are more abundant, it gives the star 
more bidding power to negotiate a higher wage and decreases net organizational value 
capture. Since previous literature has focused on external visibility7, I now shift to novel 
insights that can be gleaned from viewing this construct as it is isolated within the 
organization. 
Internal Visibility. Internal visibility, or the extent to which a star’s reputation is 
known within his/her organization, will increase organizational value capture for at least 
two reasons. First, when organizations increase a star’s internal visibility by highlighting 
the star’s performance at a regional meeting or in a company bulletin, placing them as a 
mentor or role model for several employees, or simply by placing them in positions with 
high organizational visibility, the star will experience an increase in perceived fit with the 
organization because the organization is overtly endorsing the star’s performance, goals, 
and values (Kristof, 1996), which leads to organizational embeddedness. Since the 
validation resulting from internal visibility increases their embeddedness in and 
attachment to the organization, they are less likely to pursue alternative job opportunities. 
Because organizations can provide the opportunity for internal visibility at little to no 
cost and it works to increase a stars attachment, net organizational value capture will 
increase as a result of a stars internal visibility.  
Second, internal visibility might not only lead to organizational value capture 
through retention, but also by having a positive influence on organizational norms, 
because broadcasting star performance can inspire colleagues. By sharing the stars 
pioneering best practices, others will seek to replicate his/her performance. In this way, 
                                                          
7 Although I measured external visibility and social capital in data collection, because they already appear 
in the literature as predictors of value capture, I refrain from hypothesizing about them in this dissertation 
in the pursuit of a more parsimonious theoretical and analytical model.  




internal visibility can have a positive “peer spillover” effect. Because the organization 
can benefit from a stars internal visibility by influencing increased performance among 
peers, it should have a net increase on organizational value capture. To the extent that an 
organization can capitalize on a star’s motivations to become visible by increasing their 
visibility within the organization, the star will be less likely to turnover and thus wield 
less bargaining power. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: A star's internal visibility is positively related to organizational 
value capture. 
External social capital. As previously noted, social capital, in addition to 
visibility, is an important dimension of a star. Research suggests that social capital is 
related to obtaining a job (Granovetter, 1974). Thus, it makes sense that external social 
capital (i.e., social capital outside organizational boundaries) will increase a star’s 
mobility and decrease the organization’s value capturing abilities because when a star has 
contacts outside the organization, it will be easier for them to secure alternative job 
opportunities outside the organization. When a star is able to leverage an external job 
opportunity, it decreases the organizations ability to capture economic value from the 
star. 
Internal social capital. Internal social capital (i.e., social capital housed within the 
organization) can increase organizational value capture from a star for two reasons. First, 
a star’s actual performance value can be enhanced through internal social capital. A 
recent theme in the stars literature would suggest that stars have abundant social capital 
(Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2014; Oettl, 2012; Oldroyd & Morris, 2012). As productivity 
is increasingly a function of recombining specialized human capital from multiple actors 
(Jones, 2009), a star’s performance levels often coincide with their ability to socially 




connect multiple strategic actors (Oettl, 2012). Thus, the most productive stars enhance 
their performance through capitalizing on social capital inside their organizations 
(Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2014). If stars are motivated by the opportunity to make 
valuable social connections, then organizations can capitalize on this motivation through 
offering increases in internal social capital (e.g., rotating them through different business 
units or arranging the stars introduction to important contacts within the organization). 
The socially complex nature of value creation associated with a stars internal social 
capital (Barney, 1991) make it harder for the star to replicate such value creation outside 
the organization. Thus, this value creation will likely be captured by the organization.  
Second, a star’s internal social capital increases their solidarity with coworkers 
and peers (P. S. Adler & Kwon, 2002) as well as the affective bonds (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998) that accompany social capital. Individuals find utility in work 
relationships and often self-report the people they work with as being one of the major 
drivers of retention (Lee & Mitchell, 1994). Because internal social capital is socially 
complex and historically path dependent, the star might perceive the idiosyncratic nature 
of their internal social capital as something that would be hard to imitate in another 
organization (i.e., star perceives it as organization specific social capital). This would 
increase uncertainty of a star’s perceived fit with job opportunities outside the 
organization and decrease the likelihood of an exit8. This line of reasoning leads to my 
next hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4: A star's internal social capital is positively related to 
organizational value capture. 
                                                          
8 The retention benefits of increasing a star’s internal social capitalshould be weighed against the 
deleterious effects that extreme social capital can have on the star’s performance (Oldroyd & Morris, 2012) 
and the increased negative effects that a well internally-connected star’s turnover may have on firm 
performance (Shaw, Duffy, Johnson, & Lockhart, 2005). 




2.3 THE MEDIATING ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS  
Expanding on the notion that stars who are more socially embedded in the 
organization are associated with less flight risk (O’Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989), I 
now integrate earlier arguments about organizational embeddedness by arguing it as the 
mechanism through which internal visibility and social capital increase an organizations 
ability to capture value from a star.   
By aiding a star in gaining internal visibility, an organization is affirming and 
validating that the star’s performance is not only valued, but exemplary. It sends the 
signal that the star is the very type of employee that exemplifies what the organization 
stands for. In this sense, the star is a prototype for the values and goals espoused by the 
organization (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Signaling to the star that they are a prototype of the 
espoused organizational values will increase the attachment that the star has to the 
organization. This suggests that there is a high level of congruence between the espoused 
values and goals of the organization and the star, which increases the star’s perceived fit 
with the organization (Edwards, 2008). As noted earlier, the fit experienced by an 
individual is one of the formative elements of organizational embeddedness (Mitchell et 
al., 2001). Thus, since I argue that internal visibility leads to organizational value capture 
from a star by way of increased fit, I predict that a star’s organizational embeddedness 
will increase with their internal visibility and will act as the mediating mechanism 
through which internal visibility leads to organizational value capture—stated in the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a: A star's internal visibility is positively related to their 
organizational embeddedness. 




Hypothesis 5b: A star’s internal visibility has a positive indirect effect on 
organizational value capture through organizational embeddedness. 
I have previously argued that when stars have more internal social capital within 
an organization, they will capture less of the value that they create for the organization. 
This is because when they have more internal social capital, they essentially have more 
‘links’ to the organization (Mitchell et al., 2001). When stars feel a larger sense of 
connectedness to individuals inside their organization, it increases their attachment to the 
organization because the value obtained through those relationships (e.g., solidarity, 
belongingness, resources etc.,) is made available through the organization—severing ties 
with the organization would result in, to a large extent, the severing of those relationships 
and all that they offer the star. Since the links that an individual has to an organization are 
also one of the elements that determines the level of organizational embeddedness the 
star experiences in an organization, I posit that the impact that internal social capital can 
have on organizational value capture from a star is mediated through the stars 
organizational embeddedness. In other words: 
Hypothesis 6a: A star's internal social capital is positively related to their 
organizational embeddedness. 
Hypothesis 6b: A star’s internal social capital has a positive indirect effect on 
organizational value capture through organizational embeddedness. 
In conclusion, star employees present a significant management quandary: while 
they are observed to create tremendous value in organizations, their disproportionately 
high external visibility and social capital gives them extreme job mobility. A star’s job 
mobility increases their bargaining power, limiting an organization’s ability to capture 
value from them. As such, this chapter takes a multi-disciplinary approach to build theory 




on the factors that act as voluntary mobility constraints, thus, retaining stars through non-
monetary means and increasing an organization’s value capturing ability. By delineating 
how organizations can increase a stars organizational embeddedness through increases in 
internal visibility and social capital, I outline ways organizations can “align the stars” in 
order to isolate them from the alluring financial opportunities outside the organization 
that often tempt them away. Concurrently, I also make a case that there is strategic value 
inherent in employee organizational embeddedness. Previously, embeddedness has been 
conceptualized only as it relates to retention and individual performance; I present here a 
novel application of this theory as it relates to an organizations ability to capture value 
from individuals in an effort to uncover some of the psychological foundations of 
competitive advantage. This being an effort to answer calls for research bridging the 
micro – macro divide (Ployhart & Hale, 2014; Ployhart, 2012). 
      
      





















DO TELL? THE EFFECT OF STAR STATUS NOTIFICATION ON EMBEDDEDNESS, 
TURNOVER INTENTIONS, AND VALUE CAPTURE 
 As the “war for talent” has intensified over the last twenty years (Michaels, 
Handfield-Jones, & Axelrod, 2001), organizations have invested considerable resources 
to identify, develop, and retain those individuals deemed to have the most valuable 
human capital (see Aguinis & O’Boyle, 2014; Cappelli & Keller, 2014 for recent 
reviews). Although practitioner interest in talent management has reached a crescendo, 
scholarship on talent management has yet to engage this phenomenon in some important 
ways (Peter Cappelli & Keller, 2014), which has led to a lack of in knowledge around 
some fundamental issues. 
 One of the pervasive organizational responses to the growing need for outstanding 
talent is that organizations have formal programs to identify these individuals in order to 
groom them for leadership or other strategically positioned duties (Dries & Pepermans, 
2008; Dries, Van Acker, & Verbruggen, 2012; Fernandez-Araoz et al., 2011). These 
initiatives brand these individuals with several different names (e.g., high potentials, fast 
tracker, rising stars, or high flier), but the intent behind these strategic programs share a 
similar thread: to further capitalize on the best talent housed within the organization by 
grooming them for executive leadership positions.  
 The focus of this chapter is to understand the impact of an important decision 
regarding stars: should management notify a star that they are considered as such? More 
specifically, we lack knowledge of whether star status notification has a positive or 




negative impact on the subsequent value sharing and turnover intentions of the star. Thus, 
to advance the stars and talent development literatures, I develop theory and hypotheses 
that will shed light on the consequences of star status notification.  
3.1 STAR STATUS NOTIFICATION 
 Status is defined as the amount of admiration and respect that an individual has in 
the eyes of relevant others (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). When dealing with stars in the 
organizational setting, star status notification is defined as communicating to the star that 
they are viewed as having stars status by management within the focal organization. 
Thus, notification of star status would initiate stars to have higher status in the 
organization, and to encounter a status change (upwards); note that high status and status 
change are theoretically distinct (Pettit et al., 2013), but that star status notification will 
be associated with both high status and upward status change. Some have suggested that 
by communicating star status, an organization provides the star with validation that aides 
their development and retention (Fernandez-Araoz et al., 2011; Iles, 2006). Star status 
notification acts as a strong signal that the organization places a very high value on the 
star; this valuation and status elevation can be received by the star as a form of 
compensation (Duffy, Shaw, & Schaubroeck, 2008). Nevertheless, we lack empirical 
evidence supporting a desirable impact resulting from status notification in the context of 
stars. 
 Inversely, there is extensive research that suggests there are perils associated with 
high status and status change in particular (Exline & Lobel, 1999; Fragale et al., 2009; 
Jensen et al., 2014; Pettit et al., 2013), which would suggest star status designation may 
have a negative impact on stars. Additionally, those recognized as stars may become 
more visible and have stronger signals of quality in the job market (Spence, 1973)—




which could lead to higher turnover intentions (Allen & Griffeth, 2001). With both of 
these views at odds, we lack understanding about if or when star status communication 
will increase a star’s performance and retention.  
 In this dissertation, I will argue that the net effect of star status notification will be 
positive because these forces will be stronger in our setting. Thus, going forward, I 
discuss rationale for the positive implications that the high status associated with star 
status notification might have on stars performance value creation9 and organizational 
value capture and ultimately hypothesize that the net effect of status notification will 
positively benefit their organizations. Because star status notification creates a status 
change resulting in higher absolute status in organizations, I utilize status literature that 
talks about both high status and status change when providing rationale for my 
hypotheses. 
  Research outlines the positive effects that high status can have for an individual 
including access to (1) more resources (Merton, 1968a), (2) important social ties 
(Oldroyd & Morris, 2012), and (3) opportunities (Sørensen, 1996). In the following, I 
argue that when individuals are notified that they are designated as having star status (i.e., 
an increase in their social position), they will have an increase in the amount of value 
they create and will lead to more organizational value capture.  
 Status notification should lead to increased value creation and capture for at least 
two reasons: First, there will be an increase in effort towards value creation from the star 
because this notification essentially places them in a larger “pond” (Frank, 1985) where 
the rewards for their outstanding performance are vastly higher. They are placed in an 
                                                          
9 As noted in chapter 2, value creation (from which organizational value capture is derived) is synonymous 
with a star’s performance, the terms are used interchangeably throughout this section.  




elite group that is viewed by the organization as having executive potential. Thus, 
Tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) would predict that their effort and 
performance would increase; and because this new tournament that they have entered into 
is unique to the organization they are in, it will lead to increased organizational value 
capture. This is because the executive promotion tournament represented in star status 
notification is unique to the stars current organization (and not easily replicated by 
competitors), thus, the star is likely to increase efforts to create value without leverage to 
capture said value—leaving more for the organization to appropriate.    
  Second, counter to the idea that envy is the result of high status (Kim & Glomb, 
2014), theory also suggest that virtuous cycles are set into action by positive shifts in 
status. The notion of “cumulative advantage” (Cole & Cole, 1973; Merton, 1968b) 
suggests that higher status individuals are not only given access to more resources, but 
they are also given higher regard for similar work product when compared to low status 
individuals. These reinforcing processes make it more likely that the increase in status 
would lead the star to create more value. Again, this virtuous cycle is idiosyncratic to the 
organization and created within firm boundaries; thus, the increase in value creation will 
not be as vulnerable to capture by the star.  
 Because star status notification is likely to increase value creation from the star—
through tournament and cumulative advantage means (Bothner, Podolny, & Smith, 
2011)—without relatively increasing the stars ability to capture the increased value 
creation, I hypothesize the following:    
Hypothesis 7: Star status notification will be will be positively associated with 
organizational value capture from stars. 




 Historically, research seeking to understand why an individual might voluntarily 
turnover has often focused on factors affecting an individual’s ease of movement in the 
labor market and job alternatives (e.g., March & Simon, 1958; Mobley et al., 1979). A 
star designation will increase an individual’s visibility and can work as a strong signal to 
the job market (Spence, 1973), which will increase the perceived ease of movement. 
Allen and Griffeth (2001) found that “to the extent that individuals differ in their 
perceptions of how visible their performance is, these perceptions should influence the 
extent to which individuals of varying performance levels perceive that they have 
alternative employment opportunities” (p. 1017). Because being informed of star status 
will increase how visible an individual perceives their performance to be, it will increase 
their perceived alternative employment opportunities and increase their turnover 
intentions. To sum, because status notification will increase a star’s perceived ease of 
movement in the external labor market it will act as a cue to seek promotions outside the 
organization; thus, the traditional model of turnover predicts that status notification will 
increase turnover intentions.  
 However, there exists a significant amount of research concluding that individuals 
who are more embedded in their organizations (Kiazad, Holtom, Hom, & Newman, 
2015) are less likely to turnover (see Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002 for a meta-analysis). 
As such, I will now build arguments that suggest the communication of star status will 
decrease turnover intentions because it leads to an increase in internal visibility and social 
capital—in turn leading to more organizational embeddedness.  
 Increases in status—like those resulting from star designation—have been argued 
to be valued as highly as absolute pay level (Duffy et al., 2008). This is because 
individuals derive esteem and self-worth from their social positions within their 




organizations (Ravlin & Thomas, 2005). Furthermore, social positions in organizations 
provide information about an individuals’ relative worth versus coworkers and the 
individual’s subsequent power (Thye, 2000) to acquire resources and enhance their 
reputation. Because individuals place such a high value on status, and organizations have 
the discretion to delineate status distinctions, organizations have the power to increase 
perceived organizational support in the notification of star status. The notification 
validates the employee’s contributions, signals that the organization wants to invest in the 
individual, and indicates that the organization has hopes for a productive future exchange 
relationship (Blau, 1964). The resulting increase in the expectation of future 
investment—on the part of both the employee and the organization—is likely to increase 
expectations of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Thus, when organizations notify stars of 
their status, it is likely to decrease their turnover intentions. 
Hypothesis 8a: Star status notification will be negatively associated with a star’s 
turnover intentions.  
 Drawing on previous arguments that organizational embeddedness is the totality 
of forces that encourage “staying” in organizations, I argue that star status notification 
indirectly impacts turnover intentions through organizational embeddedness. 
Hypothesis 8b. Star status notification has a negative indirect effect on turnover 
intentions through increasing organizational embeddedness. 
 The arguments made in the previous chapter that internal visibility will work to 
retain the star because it increases their organizational embeddedness are relevant here as 
well. This is because status notification should result in an increase in perceived internal 
visibility. The organization is officially placing the star on a pedestal when they notify 
them of their status. The star will now believe that others, besides his/her direct report is 




aware of his/her contributions. When the star is notified that they are in an elite group of 
individuals chosen and groomed to be the future of the organization, they will have 
instilled in them an increased confidence that their reputation is increasing within the 
organization (March & Simon, 1958).  
 Similarly, status notification will increase the stars perceived internal social 
capital. Status notification reveals that there are individuals inside the organization that 
hold them in high regard. This apparent “goodwill” signals that the star has multiple 
advocates within the organization. The growing efficacy surrounding the stars internal 
networking ability will lead them to reach out to more people. Furthermore, star status is 
often accompanied by strategic rotations that will introduce them to more individuals and 
allow them to make more connections. The increase in the collective social links that are 
experienced by the star as a result of their status notification will lead to greater 
attachment to and embeddedness in the organization. The preceding rationale lead me to 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 9a: Star status notification will be positively associated with a star’s 
organizational embeddedness. 
Hypothesis 9b: Star status notification has a positive indirect effect on 
organizational embeddedness through increasing internal visibility. 
Hypothesis 9c: Star status notification has a positive indirect effect on 
organizational embeddedness through increasing internal social capital. 
 The final model resulting from the hypothesized relationships in both chapter 2 
and 3 is illustrated in Figure 3 below. A serial mediation model is built where the causal 
chain (starting with star status notification and ending with organizational value capture) 
seeks to explain how organizations can manage stars in such a way that they are able to 




maximize the value sharing relationship. The hypothesis stating the full serial mediation 
model is as follows: 
Hypothesis 10: Star status notification has a positive serial indirect effect on 
organizational value capture through organizational embeddedness and turnover 
intentions. 
 Where previous models have sought to uncover barriers to mobility that 
organizations can use to constrain stars in order to capture value from their value creation 
(B. Campbell et al., 2012), I have taken an alternative approach which focused on the 
psychological motivations that might create a stickiness around star performers within an 
organization. Thus, I have sought to explain when stars might, of their own volition, 
share the value they create inside organizations and thus, contribute to competitive 
advantage in firms; because the nature of organizational embeddedness carries 
idiosyncrasies that are hard for outside firms to understand and imitate (Barney, 1991; 
Reed & DeFillippi, 1990). 
  
       
       


























Note. Hypothesized indirect effects are illustrated above on the last stage of the indirect path. Dotted lines are hypotheses 
appearing in Chapter 2. Performance, as a proxy for value creation, is represented as an element of organizational value capture 
(i.e., organizational value capture is the stars performance relative to salary). Although other variables were measured (e.g., 
external visibility and social capital, and mentoring), only the variables that provided the most novel and parsimonious 


























 In order to test hypotheses, data collected must have some key features. First, the 
organization must have a codified, formal process for identifying stars. Second, status 
must not be uniformly communicated to stars in order to find variance. Lastly, in order to 
measure organizational value capture, key archival information about the stars (1) value 
creation and (2) value capture must be available in order to understand the relative 
distribution of value between the star and organization. 
 Thus, data were collected from individuals working in a publicly traded, mid-
sized financial services firm with headquarters in the United States. Interviews with 
senior human resource leaders within the organization provided guidance for the 
identification of participants (i.e., who the “stars” were in their organizations). The 
organization had a codified process for identifying stars based on their overall value to 
the organization (e.g., performance, leadership behaviors, and other talent assessment 
factors) and termed them as “high potentials”. I note that the “potential” is referring to 
executive potential as everyone in this group has a proven track record of performance in 
their current role. Talent leadership annually designated individuals as high potentials. 
While management was not actively hiding information about star designations, they also 
were not actively conveying this information, providing adequate variance for star status 
notification among participants. Thus, there was variance among stars with regard to how 




informed they were of their status. Archival performance and salary data were obtained in 
order to asses organizational value capture. Originally, the participating organization 
agreed to sample 800 employee (including 342 stars). However, shortly before the survey 
was administered, the organization reduced the sample population to a total of 200 stars. 
The population was considered the top 2.8% in terms of performance and potential value 
of the total employees working in the organization (200 of 7,100). Of the 200 stars 
surveyed, 155 of them responded resulting in a response rate of 77.5% (155 out of 200). 
 Jobs varied among participants, but the majority comprised of positions in the 
retail and commercial loan chain (e.g., underwriting, sales, leadership, actuarial etc.). 
Demographic data were gathered from company records which indicated that the sample 
was 84.0% white, 4.6% African American, 4.6% Hispanic, and 6.6% Asian. Additionally, 
56% percent of the sample were male and the mean age of the sample was 37.8 (s.d. = 
7.67; Min = 26.45, Max = 64.32). Those sampled were encouraged by management to 
participate in the survey and were informed that their individual responses would only be 
viewed by a third party research team (i.e., their individual responses would be kept 
confidential from their organization) and that results from analyses would only be 
reported in aggregate form, thus, curtailing method bias due to social desirability.  
4.2 MEASURES10 
4.2.1 Organizational Value Capture 
 At the conceptual level, I have defined organizational value capture as the amount 
of value appropriated by the organization from the total value created by employees. For 
the purposes of this dissertation, I am particularly interested in predicting organizational 
value capture from stars. The necessary components of a measure of organizational value 
                                                          
10 See the Appendix for the full measures, including every item.  




capture should reflect the relative balance of (1) the value created by the employee and 
(2) the amount of said value captured by the employee/organization. To do so, I rely on 
the basic assumption that an employee’s performance represents their value creation 
(Roth et al., 2001; see Sturman, 2012 for a review). Supervisory ratings of individual job 
performance are a quantitative statement of what the organization values (J. P. Campbell 
et al., 1993), thus, supervisor’s evaluations of performance were used to proxy for 
employee value creation—accounting for the first element needed above. Employee 
salary is a common way to operationalize the extent to which an employee can capture 
the value they create (Bidwell, Won, Barbulescu, & Mollick, in press.; Della Corte & Del 
Gaudio, 2014). Salary is comprised solely of economic value appropriated by the 
employee (while similar measures like replacement cost include elements not captured by 
the employee); employee salary is also driven by market forces that add to its 
comprehensiveness in estimating how much value an employee is able to capture. Thus, 
the two essential elements (i.e., employee value creation and capture) were approximated 
as follows: employee performance acts as a proxy of employee value creation (Sturman, 
2012), and salary represents employee value capture. 
All else equal, if an employee has higher (lower) performance than other 
employees (i.e., creating more relative value), one would expect him/her to be paid more 
(less)—or capture more (less) relative value. To the degree that there are discrepancies in 
the relationship between employee value creation (performance) and capture (salary), 
either the employee or the organization would be capturing relatively more or less value 
than an efficient value creation/capture relationship would predict.  




Thus, to measure an organization’s ability to capture value from potential stars 
performance, I regressed participants annual salary on their performance11 and interpret 
the residuals in this regression equation (i.e., the difference between the actual and 
predicted salary compared to performance) to represent the amount of value potential 
stars captured relative to the value they created (See Figure 4 for the actual plot). Positive 
residuals (observations above the predicted salary) would suggest that employees were 
overpaid for their relative value creation, while negative residuals would represent that 
they were underpaid, or capturing less relative value than is predicted. These residuals 
were multiplied by -1 in order to represent organizational value capture (instead of star 
value capture). Thus, these residuals were used to operationalize organizational value 
capture. Residuals were robust to OLS assumptions (e.g., test of normality, 
heteroskedasticity) suggesting they were appropriate for analysis (See Figure 5).  
 
 FIGURE 4.1 SALARY REGRESSED ON TO INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE 
                                                          
11 This regression included several covariates (i.e., Education, pay band, Age, and Tenure) in order to 









This organizational value capture measurement approach has several advantages. First, 
since performance ratings came from the same scale for every employee across jobs, I 
was able to get a standardized measure of employee value creation allowing comparisons 
within and across job functions—whereas objective economic value creation (e.g., sales) 
was only available for 15.6% of the study population and would differ by job, making 
comparisons challenging to interpret. 
 
FIGURE 4.2 HISTOGRAM OF RESIDUALS RESULTING FROM SALARY 
REGRESSED ON TO INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 Second, although objective economic measures of value creation are often 
preferred, some have noted that they do not capture several forms of value creation (e.g., 
OCBs, leadership; Sturman, 2012). By utilizing performance ratings as a proxy for 
employee value creation, I capture a broader set of value creation elements (e.g., 
leadership, peer influence, citizenship behaviors). Third, where most previous 




operationalizations tend to focus on either value creation (either at the organization or 
individual level as discussed) or capture (e.g., just measuring employee salary; Bidwell, 
et. al., in press), the measure described here, incorporating both value creation and 
capture, is able to estimate the extent to which the star or organization are capturing value 
that is created by the star. 
 Assessing construct validity via differences in organizational value capture 
between stars and non-stars. All hypotheses in this dissertation are within the group of 
employees considered to be stars, and, thus, there are no hypothesis tests assessing 
differences between stars and non-stars. However, the organizational value capture 
variable was created from an archival data set which had observations for the whole 
company. This same data set also had information on whether or not individuals were 
stars. As such, I was able to test whether stars were able to capture more of the value they 
create compared to non-stars.  
 Previous literature would suggest that stars are able to capture more of the value 
they create because they are more visible in the job market and have more social capital 
that gives them leverage to increase their bargaining power (Call et al., 2015; Coff, 
1999). To empirically test whether this was the case in my data, I created the same 
variable used as the criterion in my analyses for hypothesis testing for organizational 
value capture for each individual in the data set (N = 5,647)12. I then regressed this 
criterion on the star/non-star dummy variable (non-stars were coded as ‘0’, stars were 
coded as ‘1’). There was a significant difference in organizational value capture between 
stars and non-stars (β = -13,405.47; p < 0001; N = 5,647). Thus, stars are on average able 
                                                          
12 I did not, however, have data for the non-stars on their level of education which was one of the controls 
used in the regression to produce the residuals representing organizational value capture. 




to capture $13,405.47 more dollars than non-stars for creating the same value (with the 
same performance level). This is important because it demonstrates that the total amount 
of value creation is not what gives employees the ability to capture value. In the case of 
stars, attributes beyond performance—arguably visibility and social capital—give them 
more leverage to bid up their wage in order to capture more of the value they create.  
 Despite its advantages, this measure is not without its concerns. The performance 
measures used as a proxy for employee value creation were obtained from supervisors 
and are, thus, vulnerable to subjective bias, thus introducing contamination and 
deficiency (Wang, Wong, & Kwong, 2010). However, performance ratings obtained in 
this study were not made known to employees and were only for internal company use. 
Although this does not eliminate socially desirable responses and leniency bias 
(Holzbach, 1978), it should attenuate them.  
 In addition to the measure described above, I also collected a self-report measure 
of employee value capture. This measure had questions like, “I am paid more than I am 
worth” and, “Relative to others in (my company) with similar job performance, I make 
more money.” This self-report measure produced a marginally significant correlation to 
the measure above (r = 16; p = .06) and was correlated to similar covariates (e.g., age, 
tenure).  
4.2.2 Turnover Intentions 
 To measure the turnover intentions of stars I administered Kelloway, Gottlieb, 
and Barham’s (1999) 4-item measure (e.g., “I am thinking about leaving this 
organization,”; 1 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “strongly agree”). Coefficient alpha in was at 
an acceptable level (α = .93).  
 




4.2.3 Internal Social Capital 
 Internal social capital was measured with Ng and Feldman’s (2010) measure of 
social capital development behaviors, which measures perceptions of behaviors leading 
to the accumulation of social capital inside the organization (e.g., “I spend a lot of time 
and effort at work networking with others”; 1 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “strongly agree”) 
and outside the organization (e.g., “I spend a lot of time and effort networking with others 
outside my organization; 1 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “strongly agree”). Coefficient alpha 
was .85. 
4.2.4 Internal Visibility 
 In line with past research seeking to understand the implications of visibility in 
the external labor market, I adapted the 3-item measure of visibility used by Allen and 
Griffeth (2001) with the addition of one item, which assesses the extent to which the star 
perceives their performance and reputation to be visible outside his organization (e.g., “It 
is easy for prospective employers to tell if I am a good employee”; “1 = “strongly 
disagree,” 5 = “strongly agree”). The added item was seeking to capture perceived 
reputation visibility because my conceptualization included elements of not only job 
performance visibility, but also reputation (i.e., “Many prospective employers know of 
my reputation”). To assess internal visibility, I adapted the external visibility scale above 
by substituting “manager and coworkers within my organization” for “prospective 
employers”. (1 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “strongly agree”; α = .87).  
4.2.5 Star Status Notification 
 To measure whether or not the star had been notified of their status by their 
organizations, I asked the question, “Have you been told that you are considered a “High 




Potential” employee by your employer?” Yes and No answers were dummy coded for 
analyses. Participants were also asked when they were notified (what year). 
4.2.6 Organizational embeddedness 
The original measure of job embeddedness was formative (Mitchell et al., 
2001)—meaning that job embeddedness was “caused” by the separate dimensions of 
“fit”, “links”, and “sacrifice”. Formative measures lead to problems with internal 
consistency, identification, and causality assessment (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000; 
Edwards, 2010), particularly when using structural equation models (L. J. Williams, 
Edwards, & Vandenberg, 2003). Furthermore, my theory was interested in global 
embeddedness as opposed to a more fine-grained view that would be measured in the 
traditional Mitchell et al., formative scale (e.g., I was not interested in the particular 
impact of off-the-job links). Thus, I used a reduced version of a reflective measure of 
organizational embeddedness (Crossley et al., 2007) that consisted of five questions 
regarding the overall levels of embeddedness the star feels (e.g., “I’m too caught up in 
this organization to leave”; 1 = “strongly disagree,” 5 = “strongly agree”). Reliability in 
was at an acceptable level (α = .81).  
4.2.6 Control variables 
 I included variables that previous literature would suggest might predict 
organizational value capture in the regression that produced residuals used as my 
dependent variable. First, education significantly increased an individual’s ability to 
capture value they created, thus, is was controlled for prior to obtaining residuals that 
represent the dependent variable. As well, age and tenure were both included in the 
regression of salary on performance in order to account for these factors that might 
predict organizational value capture. Because these effect of these variables on the 




dependent variable were accounted for in the residual estimation, they were not included 
in the analysis for hypothesis testing, although they appear in the correlation table for 
transparency.   
4.3 ANALYSIS 
 Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test hypotheses. SEM provides 
several advantages as opposed to conventional OLS regression. First, SEM allows for the 
simultaneous modeling of multiple dependent variables. This give researchers the ability 
to test for multiple direct, indirect and total effects. Second, SEM includes a confirmatory 
factor analyses (CFA) to adjust coefficients for the measurement error associated with 
manifest variables (my models include four latent variables). 
 Overall fit of the models was assessed using different fit indices (Hu & Bentler, 
1998). I report the Chi squared, which is the most widely used fit index. I also assessed fit 
via the root-mean-squared error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index 
(CFI), goodness of fit index (GFI), non-normed index (NNFI), also known as the Tucker-
Lewis index, adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), and standardized root mean squared 
residual (SRMR) (Steiger, 1990). Adequate fit is assessed by values less than .09 for 
RMSEA and SRMR, while good fit is also represented in value above .90 with the other 
fit indices (i.e., CFI, GFI, AGFI, and NNFI; Cheung & Rensvold, 2001). Changes in CFI 
were used to make model comparisons to assess the incremental fit associated with 
additional variables (e.g., mediators/moderators; Hu & Bentler, 1998). Once the fit of the 
data was established, the significance and size of standardized path coefficients test the 
hypothesized direct effects (L. Williams, Vandenberg, & Edwards, 2009). The indirect 
effects were estimated via 95% bias-corrected bootstrapped CI for indirect effects using 




1,000 bootstrap samples and full information maximum likelihood estimation 
(MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). 
 A power analysis conducted using a moderate effect size for SEM including the 
amount of variables and relationships modeled suggested approximately N > 367. 
Because the sample size used in this study contained fewer participants than this (N = 
155), the hypothesis tests may be overly conservative and susceptible to Type 2 statistical 
error. However, data from this population can be particularly challenging to collect. For 
these reasons, I continue to test and report results, but future research should seek to 
replicate the findings in this study with a larger sample. 
4.3.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 I performed a series of CFAs to test the measurement model of the latent variables 
to be included in the path model (i.e., internal visibility, internal social capital, 
organizational embeddedness, and turnover intentions). Latent factors were assessed 
using item-level indicators. The hypothesized four factor model fit the data well: χ2 = 
258.66, df = 129; RMSEA = .08; standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .06; 
goodness of fit index (GFI) = .99; comparative fit index (CFI) = .92; non-normed index 
(NNFI), also known as the Tucker-Lewis index =.90; adjusted goodness of fit index 
(AGFI) = .98. In order to assess whether fit indices indicated that a four factor model fit 
the data better than a one factor models, I looked at the change in fit between models (See 
Table 1). I also tested a two factor model where internal visibility and social capital 
loaded on one factor and embeddedness and turnover intentions loaded on another—
because these scales carried similar constructs. Finally, I assessed the change in fit from a 
three factor model (internal visibility, internal social capital, and embeddedness and 




turnover intentions loading on one factor); the confirmatory factor analysis suggests that 
the four factor structure provided the best fit in the data.  
   







































*The four factor was the hypothesized model. Change in chi squared and CFI are the changes 
resulting from adding each additional factor (i.e., from one to two factors, two to three factors 
etc.). N = 155 
 








5.1 RESULTS FROM FORMAL HYPOTHESES 
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Zero-order correlations along with means and standard deviations of variables are 
reported in Table 1. Note that several bivariate relationships are consistent with prior 
findings. For example, organizational embeddedness is highly correlated with turnover 
intentions (r=-.66; p = < .05) suggesting that organizational embeddedness decreases 
turnover intentions. Coefficient alphas are depicted in the diagonal.  
5.1.2 Hypothesis Tests   
 Utilizing the lavaan package in the R software (Rosseel, 2012), I tested the model 
depicted in Figure 5. Each of the latent variables were modeled using each item level data 
as single indicators (Cortina, Chen, & Dunlap, 2001); thus incorporating the 
measurement model in with the corresponding path analysis, both associated with SEM. 
In order to test the hypothesized indirect effects, the direct path making up these indirect 
paths were also modeled (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002) to 
account for the three part mediation test where the independent variable predicts both the 
dependent and mediating variable and the mediator predicts the dependent variable. 
Finally, bias-corrected bootstrapping was used to test for mediation. Variables were 
standardized for interpretation and in an attempt to avoid non-essential multicollinearity 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 1983). 




 Overall fit of the model presented in Figure 5 was assessed using different fit 
indices (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Specifically, model fit indices were: χ2 = 325.92; df = 160; 
RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .09; GFI = .98; CFI = .89; AGFI = .98; NNFI = .88. These 
model fit indices suggest that the total fit of the model to the data is adequate. In 
particular, RMSEA is below .09 and both GFI and NNFI are above the standard cutoffs 
(.90) for adequate fit.  
  Once the fit of the data was established, the significance and size of standardized 
path coefficients were used to test the hypothesized direct effects (L. Williams et al., 
2009). The indirect effects were tested by assessing the significance of path coefficients 
associated with the indirect paths which were assessed via a bias-corrected bootstrapping 
procedure with 1,000 bootstraps (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004) to test for 
mediation (MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that organizational embeddedness would be positively 
related to organizational value capture. As shone in Figure 5, organizational 
embeddedness was not significantly related to organizational value capture (β = .10, n.s.); 
thus, Hypothesis 1 did not find support. Hypothesis 2 predicted a significant indirect path 
from embeddedness to organizational value capture through turnover intentions, which 
did not find empirical support in this data (β = .01, n.s.). Hypothesis 3 and 4 predicted 
that internal visibility and social capital, respectively, would be positively related to 
organizational value capture; neither hypothesis found a significant result (visibility β =   
-.05, n.s.; social capital β = -.17, p = .10). I note that internal social was moderately 
related to organizational value capture, but it was not in the hypothesized direction; 
possibly suggesting that when stars have more internal social capital, they are able to 
wield this goodwill towards capturing more value—which would be consistent with 




Blyler and Coff’s (2003) assertion that social capital is a deciding factor in how value is 
split up by stakeholders. 
 Hypothesis 5a predicted that internal social capital would be positively related to 
organizational embeddedness, which it was (β = .26, p < .05). A significant indirect path 
between visibility and organizational value capture through embeddedness was not found 
(β = .03, n.s.), showing lack of support for Hypothesis 5b. Similarly, internal social 
capital did predict organizational embeddedness (β = .22, p < .05), supporting Hypothesis 
6a, while Hypothesis 6b (predicting that embeddedness mediated the relationship 
between internal social capital and organizational value capture) was not supported (β = 
.02, n.s.). 
 Chapter 3 integrated star status notification into the overall model. First, 
Hypothesis 7, which predicted that star status notification would lead to organizational 
value capture was not supported (β = .34, p = .16). The prediction in Hypothesis 8a that 
notification would be associated with decreased turnover intentions did not find support 
in the structural equation model (β = .09, n.s.), despite showing a significant bivariate 
correlation (r = =.17). However, Hypothesis 8b, which predicted an indirect path from 
status notification through organizational embeddedness, did find support (β = -.57, p = 
<.05), suggests that status notification does decrease turnover intention through the 
indirect path of increasing organizational embeddedness.  
 Hypothesis 9a which predicted notification would be related to embeddedness 
was supported (β = .82, p < .05) suggesting that when stars are notified of their status, it 
makes them more embedded in their organizations. Hypothesis 9b and 9c hypothesized 
about the mediating mechanisms between notification and embeddedness; Hypothesis 9b 
was supported (β = .21, p < .05), suggesting that, for stars, the increase in internal 




visibility is an important intervening mechanism in the relationship between status 
notification and embeddedness. Hypothesis 9c, positing that internal social capital 
mediates the path between notification and embeddedness, did not find significance (β = 
.12, n.s.).  
 Finally, Hypothesis 10 integrated hypotheses by predicting a serial indirect effect 
of star status notification on organizational value capture through both organizational 
embeddedness and turnover intentions; this hypothesis was not supported (β = .01, n.s.). 
Taken in their entirety, these results suggest that star status notification is an important 
predictor of retention among stars and that this impact travels through the indirect paths 
of increased internal visibility and social capital and organizational embeddedness.  
 
 
      
      





TABLE 5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Star Status Notification .88 .32  -   
       2. Internal Visibility 3.88 .70 .25* .87 
      3. Internal Social Capital 3.66 .66 .15 .40* .85 
     4. Organizational Embeddedness 3.34 .81 .27* .34* .28* .81 
    5. Turnover Intentions 2.34 .83 -.17* -.27* -.15 -.66* .93 
   6. Organizational Value Capture .00 28075.58 .12 -.03 -.13 .07 -.08      - 
  7. Age 37.38 7.41 -.20* -.04 -.05 .04 -.11 .00      - 
 8. Education 2.35 .66 .02 .05 -.11 -.16 .07 .00 .04      - 
9. Tenure 8.20 6.19 .10 .08 .00 .14 -.07 .15 .48* .01 
 









      
      














FIGURE 5.1 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL RESULTS 
Model fit: χ
2
 = 325.92; DF = 160; RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .09; GFI = .98; CFI = .89; AGFI = .98; NNFI = .88 
 
Note. Path coefficients are standardized. Manifest variables are depicted as rectangles and latent variables are depicted as 
circles. Full information maximum likelihood estimation was used; N = 155; **p < .01, *p < .05 
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.27** 
Embeddedness » OVC 
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 Internal SC » Embeddedness 
 
.23* 
Embeddedness » OVC 
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(-.07, .14)  
Hypothesis 8b 
 
 Notification » Embeddedness 
 
.57** 
Embeddedness » TO Intention 
 
-.88** 








 Notification » Internal Vis 
 
.54** 
Internal Vis » Embeddedness 
 
.27** 






Hypothesis 9c   
Notification » Internal SC  .34 
Internal SC » Embeddedness  .23* 
Notification » Internal SC » Embeddedness  .08 
  (-.03, .19) 
Hypothesis 10 
  Notification » Embeddedness 
 
.57** 
Embeddedness » TO Intention 
 
-.88** 
TO Intention » OVC    .17 
Notification » Embeddedness » TO Intention » OVC  .00 
  (-.15, .17) 
Note. Significance determined via bias corrected 95% CI for the direct and indirect effects using 
1,000 bootstrap samples; N = 155. +This CI was very but did not include zero. 
  *p < .05 
**p < .01  
      
      
         
 
 
TABLE 5.3 HYPOTHESES AND CORRESPONDING SIGNIFICANCE 
 
  Hypotheses p<.05 n.s. 
 
Chapter 2   
H1 A star’s organizational embeddedness is positively related to organizational value capture from the star.  
X 
H2 A star’s organizational embeddedness has a positive indirect effect on organizational value capture through 
decreasing turnover intentions.  
X 
H3 A star's internal visibility is positively related to organizational value capture from stars.  
X 
H4 A star's internal social capital is positively related to organizational value capture from stars.  
X 
H5a A star's internal visibility is positively related to their organizational embeddedness. X  
H5b A star’s internal visibility has a positive indirect effect on organizational value capture through organizational 
embeddedness.  
X 
H6a A star's internal social capital is positively related to their organizational embeddedness. X  




Chapter 3   
H7 Star status notification will be will be positively associated with organizational value capture from stars.  
X 
H8a Star status notification will be will be negatively associated with a star’s turnover intentions.  
X 




H9a Star status notification will be will be positively associated with a star’s organizational embeddedness. X  




H9c Star status notification has a positive indirect effect on organizational embeddedness through increasing internal 
social capital.  
X 
H10 Star status notification has a positive serial effect on organizational value capture through organizational 
embeddedness and turnover intentions. 








5.2 SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
 There were some research questions that were outside the scope of this 
dissertation but that were still of interest. Because data were available to assess additional 
questions, I present some additional analyses here assessing the two following questions: 
First, will a test of nested models justify full mediation for the indirect hypothesized 
paths? Second, what role does mentoring (whether or not the star engages in mentoring 
activities) play in their embeddedness and turnover intentions.  
5.2.1 Model comparison tests for full and partial mediation. Because I was interested in 
predicting the direct, as well as indirect effects in my hypothesized model, I did not 
perform a test of nested models for full/partial mediation prior to my hypotheses testing. 
However, because none of the direct paths leading to the criterion of organizational value 
capture were significant, I conducted model comparison test before testing my 
hypotheses to compare between full and partial mediation (J. C. Anderson & Gerbing, 
1988).  





RMSEA SRMR GFI CFI NNFI AGFI Δχ2 
 
Δ df Δ CFI 
Partial 





Mediation 331.27 163.00 .08 .10 .98 .89 .87 .98   
 
  
   N = 155 
 A chi squared difference test between the partial and full-mediation model was 
insignificant (ΔX
2 = 5.35, Δdf = 3, p > .05; See Table 2 for fit indices). Since the full and 
partial mediation did not statistically differ in how they fit the data, full meditation can be 




assumed. I note that each of the indirect paths that were significant when using the full 
model (i.e., H8b and H9b) were still significant with the nested, full mediation model. 
5.2.2 Does mentoring help or hurt a star’s organizational embeddedness and turnover 
intentions? 
 Another important way that stars add value in organizations is through the 
positive effect that they can have on their peers whether through peer retention due to 
star’s presence (Groysberg & Lee, 2010) or increased performance (Call et al., 2015). 
Despite the fact that stars are often used as role models in organizations, the stars 
literature has not integrated knowledge from the mentoring literature (Higgins & Kram, 
2001). This is an oversite because it is through mentoring that stars might have some of 
their most profound influence on others in their organizations (Call et al., 2015).  
 To explore this, I sought to assess the impact that being a mentor had on a star’s 
organizational embeddedness and turnover intentions. In supplemental analyses, I found 
that mentoring did not predict organizational embeddedness (p > .05) or turnover 
intentions (p > .05). This may seem odd; however, with stars, mentoring may be 
perceived as a nuisance. It has been suggested that stars are more likely to experience 
cognitive overload and that “the very mentoring opportunities meant to energize 
employees can feel like a punishment for success…in the case of stars”  (Oldroyd & 
Morris, 2012, p. 404). Thus, I tested mentoring as a moderator in the organizational 
embeddedness – turnover intentions relationship to see if this relationship was 
strengthened by mentoring behaviors. The logic is that when stars are not embedded in 
their organizations, mentoring will lead to higher turnover intentions. I did find that being 
a mentor interacted with organizational embeddedness to predict turnover intentions (β = 
-.30; p < .05; N = 148). To interpret the effect of this interaction, I plotted the turnover 




intentions that resulted from high and low embeddedness of stars that both acted as 
mentors and did not mentor (See Figure 7). Figure 7 depicts that when organizational 
embeddedness was low, mentoring had a positive effect on turnover intention, making 
them more likely to turnover. This suggests that mentoring responsibilities should be 







      
      



















































 In the twenty first century, the idea the people are the key to organizational 
competitiveness has entered into the management axiom  (Hitt, Bierman, & Shimizu, 
2001; Wright & McMahan, 2011). The so-called war for talent has continued to 
intensify—with competition being fiercest for the very best employees (Aguinis & 
O’Boyle, 2014; Cappelli, 2008; Kehoe et al., in press). Organizations go to great lengths 
to acquire and develop star performers, but employing stars is not without its hazards. 
Chiefly, the fact that stars can decide at any moment to walk out the door (along with all 
that the organization has invested in them) makes employing stars particularly 
challenging (Coff, 1997; Groysberg, 2012). The high-risk-high-return nature of 
employing stars is, perhaps, why so many scholars have taken an interest in 
understanding this ever increasing phenomenon of stardom. If we can offer advice on 
ways in which managers can manage the risks associated with employing stars, this 
advice would be extremely valuable.  
 Thus, this dissertation seeks to build knowledge on how to better navigate 
managing these important employees by offering some important insights to this 
literature. First, I clarify who a star is, outlining the important role the visibility and social 
capital have both inside and outside the organization. Second, I uncover voluntary 
mobility constraints that aid in retaining stars. Finally, I assess the implications of 
notifying stars of their status in the organizational setting. These contributions have 




implications for both theory and managers which I will review in the following sections. 
Limitations of the current study are examined, followed by suggestions for future 
research directions. 
6.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 For the last decade, research on stars in the strategic management field has taken 
more of an economic approach, which focuses on the mobility and resulting value 
capturing power that stars have (Groysberg et al., 2008). This previous work has posited 
that stars may do not add to organizational value without market imposed mobility 
barriers (Ganco et al., 2015)—essentially that the strategic factor market for stars is close 
to perfect (Barney, 1986). However, unlike other strategic resources, star are people, with 
psychological motivations (Coff, 1997). Because of this important distinction, I draw on 
the micro-literature to understand the psychological motivations that might represent 
voluntary mobility barriers and to understand the characteristics that might define and 
distinguish stars as unique individuals. This alternative theoretical approach is 
emblemized in the following theoretical implications encapsulated in this work. 
 Confusion among academics regarding what a star is has led scholars to commit 
the “jingle-jangle” fallacy (Block, 1957) where the same term is used for distinct 
constructs (jingle) and different terms are used for the same construct (jangle). For 
example, the words “high performer”, “star”, and “expert” have been used somewhat 
interchangeably in the management literature (Call et al., 2015). When semantic 
distinctions are not made, terms are carelessly used and communication between scholars 
is frustrated (Molloy & Ployhart, 2012), which results in a stifling of knowledge 
proliferation. Thus, my first theoretical contribution was to demarcate “sharp distinctions 
that are comprehensible to a community of scholars” (Suddaby, 2011, p. 346) to provide 




a unifying definition of a star. This was accomplished by an extensive literature review 
that spans multiple disciplines—leading to defining a star as those individuals that exhibit 
sustained and disproportionately high performance, visibility, and social capital.  
 Previous theory on stars has proliferated the notion that stars cannot provide value 
to an organization because they are extremely mobile in the job market and can bid their 
wage up to match their value creation (Groysberg, 2012). As such, my second theoretical 
contribution posits that value can be appropriated from stars by understanding voluntary 
mobility constraints. More specifically, unique motivations held by stars (e.g., the motive 
to become visible) will further embed them in their organizations without monetary 
reward leading to decreased turnover intentions. When stars perceive that they are more 
visible inside the organization, it works to increase their organizational embeddedness 
and thus, reduces their turnover intentions. Previous conceptualizations of employee 
visibility have focused on their visibility outside organizational boundaries; the 
distinction is important because this study demonstrates that internal and external 
visibility carry opposite effects on turnover intentions and embeddedness. The same 
distinction of internal vs external is use to distinguish the different types of social capital 
in this study, providing similarly novel theory on why it may impact a star to stay in an 
organization. Instead of focusing on market forces that might constrain the mobility of 
stars, this dissertation provides a novel take on mobility constrains that stars will 
voluntarily adopt. Thus, I simultaneously contribute to both micro and macro field by 
outlining the strategic value of organizational embeddedness and elucidating voluntary 
mobility constraints, respectively. 
 Lastly, despite research that suggests that status changes can have a negative 
impact on individual well-being and performance, this study offers new theory to suggest 




that when stars receive a status increase through status notification, their organizational 
embeddedness increases and their turnover intention go down. This advances theory on 
status which is somewhat torn on the effects of high status, finding that there are both 
positive and negative effects (Bothner, Kim, & Smith, 2012). While some have argued 
that increases in status lead to complacency and distraction, I build theory for why status 
notification works to increase the level of perceived fit and social links to more deeply 
embed individuals in their organization—ultimately leading them to decrease their 
willingness to withdraw from their jobs and seek alternative employment opportunities. 
This study would suggest that, as far as stars are concerned, tournament theory and the 
employee – organizational relationship literature provide a better lens through which we 
might view the star status notification phenomenon.  
 At a broad level, future theory building on stars must incorporate both micro and 
macro perspectives because, while stars are a resource capable of impacting 
organizational competiveness (Ployhart et al., 2014), they are also individuals susceptible 
to psychological motivations and biases. Thus, while this dissertation represents a first 
step into understanding psychologically driven voluntary mobility constraints, we need 
more theory that seeks to understand how stars might be uniquely motivated verses non-
stars. Are stars more or less driven by embeddedness, identification, or equity concerns 
than non-stars? The literature suggests that stars are unique, yet we still know very little 
about how that uniqueness is impacted by the breadth of micro theories in organizational 
psychology. This theoretical segue from a macro focus to incorporating a psychological 
perspective is the most important broad theoretical implication of this work. 
 
 




6.2 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS  
 This study offers several practical insights into how managers can increase a stars 
sense of embeddedness in their organization, such that they will choose to stay with an 
organization despite alternative job opportunities. Contrary to some claims that making a 
star more visible will only lead them to be more mobile, this study suggests that creating 
an environment where stars are made visible inside their organization increases their 
organizational embeddedness. Giving them the opportunity to be recognized for their 
superior performance tends to validate and motivate them. One way of increasing their 
perceived visibility is letting them know that they are considered “high potential” 
employees. Organizations are splits as to whether they believe that notifying high 
potentials of their status will lead to positive outcomes. This study suggest that notifying 
employees of their status as a high potential employee increases their embeddedness and 
decreases their intentions to quit. As such, managers should tell their stars that they are 
considered to be in an elite group. This suggestion should be weighed against the 
evidence provided in my supplemental analyses that suggests that stars are able to capture 
more of the value they create.   
 Another important avenue that managers can take to retain stars is providing 
opportunities for them to meet a wide variety of individuals within their organization. A 
large social network increases their sense of embeddedness and decreases the likelihood 
that they will want to work for another organization. Not only can work relationships 
provide a sense of belonging and identification in organizations (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Sluss & Ashforth, 2007), they also create a sense of connectedness that make the 
idea of leaving fraught with a larger psychological sacrifice (Ng & Feldman, 2010). This 




increase in the sacrifice of leaving is because relationships carry unique and idiosyncratic 
value, thus, they are hard to replicate in another organization.  
 Notifying stars of their status also had an impact on increasing their perceived 
social capital. When a star is validated by this designation, it increases the amount of 
goodwill they perceive from important organizational members. A sense that leaders are 
advocating for their success decreases the likelihood that a star will look elsewhere for 
employment. The potential the star feels their career has inside their organization will be 
positively correlated with their retention. Thus, managers should encourage and facilitate 
stars to cultivate a large social network within the company, whether through rotational 
assignments, leadership retreats, or by simply making important introductions for stars 
with executives. However, this study suggests that social capital may be negatively 
related to organizational value capture, presumably because their strategic relationships 
within the firm allow them to appropriate value (Blyler & Coff, 2003). 
6.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
 This dissertation has some limitations that should be addressed in future research. 
First, the organizational value capture variable in particular did not find significant 
relationships according to hypotheses. This is likely due to the fact that the sample size 
was low as it was related to other covariates with a theoretical relationship to 
organizational value capture (i.e., education level, age, tenure) in the archival data set 
which was larger (N = 321). Additionally, some relationship showed a numeric trend 
toward the hypotheses without meeting the accepted p < .05 alpha level. Specifically, star 
status notification (p = .16) and internal social capital (p = .11) were trending toward a 
significant relationship with organizational value capture. 




 Additionally, the administrative performance measures used to create the 
organizational value capture variable were reported by managers and may be subject to 
bias. Although these ratings were not shared with employees, they did, however, have 
consequences attached to them for the employees (e.g., they were used for promotions 
etc.). Because these ratings carried consequences for employees, managers may have 
been biased towards leniency, for example. Although scores were robust to normality 
assumptions, in the future, research rating which are less susceptible to rater bias would 
be preferable.   
 Another limitation of this study is that it the data were cross sectional. As such, I 
lacked the ability to establish causality because data were collected at one time (Einhorn 
& Hogarth, 1986)—thus, the relationships remain correlational. Future work should 
explore the dynamic relationship between changes in embeddedness and organizational 
value capture. As both performance and salary are time varying, it may be that changes in 
organizational value capture are a more sensitive and theoretically important criterion. 
 Although this study was able to establish that status notification had several 
positive effects on stars, it is entirely possible that this decision has been over-simplified 
here. For example, if the process by which individuals were chosen as high potential was 
not clearly defined, organizational members (including the stars) may think the process is 
biased and it may cause resentment. Relatedly, I was not able to obtain information from 
non-stars in this study. This limited my ability to make assertions about how star status 
notification impacted the broader organization. Arguable, the real negative impact of star 
status notification may be felt by employees that do not get recognized as stars, despite 
feelings that they should be recognized. Furthermore, what happens to stars if they fall 
off the “high potential” list is an important future direction. It may be that there are 




positive effects from notifying a star in the short run, while in the long run, the increased 
expectations about what the star deserves from the organization may lead to negative 
individual outcomes.   
 








 In order to contribute to the nascent literature on stars that exist within isolated 
research disciplines, this dissertation, first, coalesces a unifying conceptualization of stars 
as individuals that exhibit prolonged and disproportionately high performance, visibility, 
and social capital. Previous research on stars concludes that organizations cannot derive 
value from star without labor market mobility constraints. As an alternative approach, I 
explore the psychological foundations of staying behavior among stars and find that 
increases in perceived internal visibility and social capital decrease the likelihood that 
stars will seek employment outside their organizations. Additionally, many organizations 
struggle with whether to tell stars that they are considered star employees by talent 
leadership. I contribute to knowledge on the implications of notifying stars of their status 
by demonstrating theoretically and empirically that notifying stars increases their 
perceived visibility and social capital which embeds them deeper into their organizations 
to decrease their turnover intentions. These particular facets of a star’s motivation that are 
impacted by the tactical decision to notify stars of their status are brought to light only by 
a deeper knowledge of what a star is. Thus, clarifying the construct of stars and digging 
deeper into the dimensions that define them (i.e., visibility and social capital) serves to 
inform extant literature on stars and provides useful insight to managers with regard to 
their retention.   
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY INSTRUMENTS  
Survey Administered to Participants: 
 
“Instructions: 
Please take the next 15 minutes to carefully read and respond to the following questions. 
Your answers will be kept confidential; information will only be analyzed by a research 
team at the University of South Carolina. Results will only be conveyed in aggregated 
form and no individual’s responses will be communicated or reported. Your candid, 




Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following items with regard to your reputation inside your 
organization: (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
     
It is easy for managers and coworkers within my organization to 
tell if I am a good employee. 
          
If my job performance is good, I gain recognition within my 
organization. 
          
My job performance is visible to other managers and coworkers 
within my organization. 
          
Many managers and coworkers within my organization know of my 
reputation. 
          
 
Internal Social Capital: 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
items with regard to your relationships inside your organization: 
(Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
     
I spend a lot of time and effort networking with others within my 
organization. 
          
I am good at building relationships with influential people within my 
organization. 
          
Within my organization., I know a lot of important people and am well 
connected. 
          
I spend a lot of time within my organization developing connections 
with others. 
          
I am good at using my connections and network to make things happen 
within my organization.. 
          
I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates within my 
organization whom I can call on for support when I really need to get 
things done. 
          







Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following items with regard to your reputation outside your 
organization: (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
          
It is easy for prospective employers (outside my current 
organization) to tell if I am a good employee. 
          
If my job performance is good it will be easy for me to find a new 
job. 
          
My job performance is visible to other prospective employers.           
Many prospective employers know of my reputation.           
 
External Social Capital: 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following items with regard to your relationships outside your 
current organization: (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree)  
     
I spend a lot of time and effort networking with others outside my 
organization. 
          
I am good at building relationships with influential people outside 
my organization. 
          
I know a lot of important people and am well connected outside my 
organization. 
          
I spend a lot of time developing connections with others outside my 
organization. 
          
I am good at using my connections and network outside my 
organization to make things happen for my career. 
          
I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates whom 
I can call on for support when I really need to get things done. 
          
 
Job Embeddedness:  
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following items: (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
     
It would be difficult for me to leave XXXX.           
I’m too caught up in XXXX to leave.           
I feel tied to XXXX.           













Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following items: (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
     
I am thinking about leaving this organization.           
I am planning to look for a new job.           
I intend to ask people about new job opportunities.           
I don’t plan to be in this organization much longer.           
 
Legacy Beliefs (not currently used): 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following items: (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
     
I feel as though I have made a difference to many people within my 
organization. 
          
I have made and created things that have had an impact on other 
people within my organization.. 
          
I think that I will be remembered for a long time after I retire.           
Others would say that I have made unique contributions to our 
company. 
          
I feel that I have done nothing that will survive after I retire. 
(reverse coded) 
          
In general, my actions do not have a positive effect on others. 
(reverse coded) 
          
 
Mentoring Motivation (Not used in this study): 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following items: (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
     
I have no desire to mentor.           
I would like to be a mentor.           
I intend to be, or currently am a mentor.           
I would be comfortable assuming a mentoring role.           
 
Mentoring Activity: 
Do you have a formal or informal mentor? 
 Yes 
 No  
If so, how many do you have? 
_______ 
Are you a formal or informal mentor to others? 
 Yes 
 No  








Star Status Notification: 
Have you been told that you are considered a “High Potential” employee your employer? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
If yes, were you notified of your “High Potential” status through formal 
or informal channels? 
 Formal 
 Informal  
 
If so, what year were you told? ____________ 
 
 
In your opinion, what should XXX do to better develop high potential employees? 
 
Please rate the extent to which the following items get in the way of 
your development: (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
     
Not enough personal time to devote to development           
A lack of understanding for your development needs            
The cost for further education/certification           
Lack of opportunities once completed with development           
Other obstacles                                              _________________ 
 
 
Self-Report Measure of Value Capture: 
Please rate the extent to which the following items get in the way of 
your development: (Strongly disagree – Strongly agree) 
     
My job performance creates more value for Ally Financial than the 
cost of my salary. 
          
I create value that I am not compensated for.           
I am paid more than I am worth.           
At my level of contribution, I could make more money in another 
organization. 
          
Relative to others in Ally Financial with similar job performance, I 
make more money. 
          
 
What stage of your career would you say you are in? 
Early, middle, late 
 
How many companies have you worked for? 
 
What is your education level? 
